It is impossible to say with any certainty which way the CFIUS review will come down. Having spent a few articles looking at CFIUS and the 2007 FINSA changes (which were supposed to have increased transparency), along with some of their recent, high-profile, cases that share some facets with the AMD-Abu Dhabi proposal, it seems like their decisions are more inscrutable than ever.
Furthermore, as detailed in previous articles, CFIUS review is highly confidential, and this is a complicated case balancing questions of military supply; relations with military and financial allies and their relations with less friendly parties in the Middle East; other existing legislation and policy; and keeping the US economy open and attractive to foreign investors. That last concern is greater than ever in the current US financial climate.
The greatest complication is we don’t even know which White House will be handling the review. If the decision doesn’t occur before Obama’s inauguration, it will be a very early and interesting test of his cabinet picks' ability to simultaneously handle the two big issues: security and economy.
It is also an important one, not just to Americans but everyone that uses a computer worldwide. Few will begrudge the US’ right to protect sensitive military technology, and CFIUS can do this through its power to impose conditions on their approval. Blocking the deal outright on the grounds that off the shelf AMD chips will make their way through the UAE to Iran, while sending billions of dollars of sophisticated military equipment to the UAE annually, is likely to draw criticism in and outside the US, however. Particularly if it leaves AMD in dire straights, and we lose the competition that has driven the availability of ever cheaper computing power.